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Constitutional Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide After Lee v. Oregon
Abstract
On November 8, 1994, Oregon voters narrowly passed the highly controversial Death with Dignity Act
(Measure 16), which marked the first time that physician-assisted suicide was explicitly legalized anywhere in
the world. In Lee v. Oregon, a group of physicians, several terminally ill persons, a residential care facility, and
individual operators of residential care facilities sought to enjoin enforcement of the new law, claiming various
constitutional infirmities. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon enjoined enforcement of the law,
acknowledging that it raised important constitutional issues including possible violations of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This note analyzes the impact of the Lee
and the debate surrounding physician assisted suicide. Part II of this Note outlines several important ethical
and legal arguments both in favor of, and opposed to, legalized assisted suicide. Part III discusses the cases that
have reviewed laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Part IV examines Measure 16 in detail, including a
review of the safeguards drafted into the act. This Note continues with a discussion of the constitutional
questions presented in Lee v. Oregon as traditionally analyzed and as treated by the court. This Note
concludes that one may not properly infer a fundamental right to assisted suicide. In addition, the Equal
Protection Clause does not prevent states from recognizing a patient's right to remove life-sustaining
treatment and hydration, while prohibiting doctors from prescribing lethal medication to the terminally ill on
request.
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Constitutional Aspects of Physician-
Assisted Suicide After Lee v. Oregon
Simon M. Canickt
Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an
ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death,
bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.
-Justice William Brennan'
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent circuit court decisions have reinvigorated the debate over the
constitutional, practical and ethical ramifications of physician-assisted suicide.2 In
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
liberty interest exists in choosing the time and manner of one's death. 3 The court
found this right to outweigh all asserted state interests, and concluded that, with
respect to competent, terminally ill adults, Washington's prohibition of assisted
suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 The ruling
effectively strikes down laws against assisted suicide in all of the states in the Ninth
Circuit.
5
In April 1996, in Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
New York's prohibition of assisted suicide violates the U.S. Constitution's Equal
t B.A., 1992, Hamilton College; J.D. candidate, 1997, Boston University School of Law. The
author would like to thank the incredible AJLM staff, his remarkably supportive family, and
wonderful friends, especially Molly, Lindsay, Jeremy, Josh, Ashley, Jeff, Courtney, and Brooks.
Special thanks to Trey Anastasio and David Wilcox for keeping me in tune.
I Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310-11 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
2 For purposes of this Note, physician-assisted suicide "occurs when a physician facilitates a
patient's death by providing the necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform
the life-ending act." Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Decisions Near
the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2229 (1992) [hereinafter Decisions].
3 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37
(1996).
4 See id. at 838; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5 The Ninth Circuit includes the following states and territories: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
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Protection Clause. 6 The court found that the law treated similarly situated groups
dissimilarly by allowing the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment even if that
would result in death, but preventing physicians from prescribing lethal medication
to other terminally ill people at their request.7 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
review both decisions, and should issue its ruling this summer.8
The U.S. Supreme Court's review of Compassion in Dying and Quill has shared
the "assisted suicide" spotlight of late. In Michigan prosecutors continue their
crusade against Dr. Jack Kevorkian, trying him unsuccessfully for violations of state
provisions against assisted suicide. 9 In Oregon, residents took a dramatic step in the
opposite direction, voting to legalize physician-assisted suicide for competent,
terminally ill people under certain circumstances.' 0
On November 8, 1994, Oregon voters narrowly passed the highly controversial
Death with Dignity Act (Measure 16), fifty-two to forty-eight percent.1' Although
physician-assisted suicide has received substantial attention in recent years, passage
of the Oregon Measure marked the first time the practice had been explicitly
legalized anywhere in the world.' 2 Measure 16, which allows physicians to prescribe
a lethal dose of medication to terminally ill people under certain conditions,
13
temporarily shifted the debate over physician-assisted suicide. Rather than grapple
with whether there exists a "right to die" protected by the U.S. Constitution, Measure
16 presented an opportunity to evaluate the novel concept of state-sanctioned
assisted suicide. Subsequently, a U.S. district court considered traditional moral and
legal arguments both for and against physician-assisted suicide in the context of a
law allowing the practice.'
4
Measure 16 authorizes a qualified patient to "request and obtain a prescription
to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner."'s Proponents of the law
hoped that it would grant competent, terminally ill persons a way of ending their
6 80 F.3d 716, 727 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1-996); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
7 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
8 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36, 36 (1996) (granting cert.); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 37, 37-38 (1996) (granting cert.).
9 See Catherine L. Bjorck, Comment, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Whose Life Is it Anyway?, 47
SMU L. REV. 371, 379-82 (1994).
'0 See Death with Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws ch. 3 (Initiative Measure No. 16) (codified at
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-995 (1995)) [hereinafter Measure 16].
11 Id.; see also Art Caplan, Oregon Voters Open Can of Worms with Assisted-Death Bill, HOUS.
CHRON., Dec. 10, 1994, at 3.
12 See Diane M. Gianelli, Assisted Suicide Showdown Headed to High Court?, AM. MED.
NEWS, Aug. 21, 1995, at 1, 1. Both euthanasia and assisted suicide are tolerated in the Netherlands,
though not explicitly legal. See Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical
Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669, 669 (1991). The Northern Territory of
Australia recently legalized euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. See, e.g., David C.
Thomasma, When Physicians Choose to Participate in the Death of Their Patients: Ethics and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 183, 188 (1996). However, on March 24, 1997,
the Australian Senate voted to overturn the law. See Alan Thornhill, Australia Repeals Euthanasia
Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1997, at A14. Four people committed suicide with assistance while the
law was in effect. See id.
13 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1995).
14 See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (D. Or. 1995).
15 OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.800 § 1.01(7).
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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AFTER LEE v. OREGON
lives with dignity, free from suffering. 16 The measure sought to achieve these goals
by exempting doctors from punishment under the criminal statute outlawing assisted
suicide.17
In Lee v. Oregon, a group of physicians, several terminally ill persons, a
residential care facility, and individual operators of residential care facilities sought
to enjoin enforcement of the new law, claiming various constitutional infirmities.' 8
The plaintiffs initially claimed that Measure 16's classification of the "terminally ill"
did not rationally relate to a legitimate state interest, and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause.' 9 The plaintiffs also argued that Measure 16 deprived depressed,
terminally ill people of their right to live, in violation of the Due Process Clause. 20
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon enjoined enforcement of the
law, acknowledging that it raised important constitutional issues including possible
violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 1 At a hearing on the merits, the court found that Measure 16 violated
the Equal Protection Clause, but it failed to reach the due process issue.22 The court
held that "Measure 16 withholds from terminally ill citizens the same protections
from suicide the majority enjoys," but suggested that, with certain modifications, the
act could pass constitutional muster.
23
Although the Compassion in Dying decision, unless reversed on appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, 24 effectively grants terminally ill patients in Oregon the right to
a physician's assistance in hastening their deaths, 25 a detailed discussion of Lee v.
Oregon remains vital. Other circuits may face challenges to laws legalizing
physician-assisted suicide, and must therefore understand Lee.26
Part II of this Note outlines several important ethical and legal arguments both
in favor of, and opposed to, legalized assisted suicide. Part III discusses the cases
that have reviewed laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. Part IV examines
Measure 16 in detail, including a review of the safeguards drafted into the act. This
Note continues with a discussion of the constitutional questions presented in Lee v.
Oregon as traditionally analyzed and as treated by the court.
16 Cf. Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (1996) (arguing that "it is reasonable to provide relief from
suffering for patients who are dying or whose suffering is so severe that it is beyond their capacity to
bear").
17 See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (providing that "[ciriminal homicide constitutes manslaughter
in the second degree when . . . [al person intentionally causes or aids another person to commit
suicide").
18 See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (D. Or. 1994).
19 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431.
20 See Lee, 869 F. Supp. at 1497.
21 See id.
22 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
23 Id.
24 The Court heard oral arguments on January 8, 1997, and is expected to issue a ruling by mid-
summer. See Linda Greenhouse, Before the Court, the Sanctity of Life and of Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1997, § 4, at 4.
25 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 791, 838 (9th Cir. 1996).
26 On February 27, 1997, the Ninth Circuit effectively reversed the district court's ruling in Lee
v. Oregon. See Lee v. Oregon, 1997 WL 80783 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997) The court held that the
plaintiffs who challenged Measure 16 lacked standing. See id. at *6 (finding that "[n]one of the
Plaintiffs can assert an 'injury in fact' resulting from the alleged ... violations").
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This Note concludes that one may not properly infer a fundamental right to
assisted suicide. In addition, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent states
from recognizing a patient's right to remove life-sustaining treatment and hydration,
while prohibiting doctors from prescribing lethal medication to the terminally ill on
request. However, this Note also concludes that under relevant U.S. Supreme Court
cases, the court in Lee v. Oregon erred by ruling that Measure 16 violated equal
protection. Because the classification drawn in Measure 16 rationally relates to a
legitimate state interest, there can be no violation of the Equal Protection Clause. If
the courts eventually strike down Measure 16, this Note recommends that sponsors
reintroduce a modified version of the law that satisfies the Lee court's concerns.
Because the court based its judgment in part on the classification's perceived
overinclusiveness, 27 it follows that a new act with tighter distinctions would pass
equal protection analysis.
II. ASSISTED SUICIDE
Both suicide generally, and physician-assisted suicide specifically, have
withstood rigorous historical scrutiny. 28  The constitutional issues this Note
addresses reflect significant moral, ethical, theological and practical concerns.
A. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
The primary arguments in support of legalized physician-assisted suicide derive
from familiar themes of dignity and personal autonomy. 29 Technology which has
extended the average life-span has also brought forth images of incapacitation,
helplessness and suffering. 30 Most Americans believe that terminally ill patients
should be allowed to end their lives before they die of natural causes.31  The
American Medical Association, while rejecting physician-assisted suicide, noted that
physicians "demonstrate respect for human dignity when [they] acknowledge 'the
freedom [of individuals] to make choices in accordance with their own values."'
32
Despite objecting to suicide generally, many feel that assisted suicide presents a
reasonable alternative to living with the perceived indignity and pain of terminal
illness.33
Closely related to the idea that we should live and die with dignity is the
celebrated concept of personal autonomy. As a popular notion, personal autonomy
implies a certain latitude of self-determination, valued because "it permits people to
27 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
28 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1890, 1890-92 (1994).
29 See Decisions, supra note 2, at 2229.
30 See id.
31 See id.; see also Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1898 (citing research demonstrating that 64% of
the American public believes a physician should be allowed to administer a lethal injection to a
terminally ill patient).
32 Decisions, supra note 2, at 2230 (quoting HASTINGS CTR., GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION
OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND CARE OF THE DYING (1987)).
33 The Model Penal Code, which categorizes assisted suicide as a second degree felony, seems
to consider suffering as a mitigating factor. Commentary to section 201.5 states that although it
might be easier to treat assisted suicide as murder, "where a husband yielded to the urging of his
incurably sick wife to provide her with the means of self-destruction, motives are too often mixed ... to
make the case compelling." MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
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form and live in accordance with their own conception of a good life, at least within
the bounds of justice and consistent with others doing so as well." 34  Laws
prohibiting assisted suicide curtail the freedom to make important choices about
one's life.
35
B. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Those who oppose legalized assisted suicide in any form often rely on moral,
religious and historical imperatives. Laws against suicide, although no longer in
force in the United States, prevailed in English common law until 1961.36 English
law "perceived suicide as an immoral, criminal offense against God and also against
the King, who as a result thereof was deprived of one of his subjects." 37 The United
States rejected laws against suicide in the mid-nineteenth century, 38 although a large
majority of states continue to criminalize aiding and abetting suicide.
39
States continue to prohibit assisted suicide to protect the sanctity of human
life.40 In principle, "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by
criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to
participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be accomplished
with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim." 41  These objections
probably originated in religious doctrine.
42
Some have argued that legalizing assisted suicide will make suicide a rational
or reasonable alternative to life. One commentator presented the worst-case
scenario:
In a suicide-permissive society plagued by shortages of various kinds
and a growing population of 'nonproductive' people, how likely is it
that an old or ill person will be encouraged to spare both herself and
her family the agony of a slow decline, even though she would not
have considered suicide on her own?
43
34 Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10,
11.
35 But see Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1894-95 (noting that opponents of assisted suicide
believe that "death irreversibly alienates autonomy and cannot be condoned by appeal to
autonomy").
36 See Leslie L. Mangini, Note, To Help or Not to Help: Assisted Suicide and its Moral,
Ethical, and Legal Ramifications, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 728, 733 (1994).
37 Id. at 732.
38 Prohibitions against suicide and attempted suicide probably disappeared because "there is no
form of criminal punishment that is acceptable for a completed suicide and ... criminal punishment
is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts to commit suicide." MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 cmt. 2
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
39 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.117 (1993); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 cmt. I
(Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959) (concluding that assisted suicide should be prohibited); cf. Antonius P.
Tsarouhas, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 793, 795-96 (1993).
40 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); cf
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 817 (9th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging the State of
Washington's unqualified interest in preserving life).
41 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
42 See Mangini, supra note 36, at 731-32; see also infra text accompanying notes 193-97.
43 Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
May-June 1993, at 32, 39; see also HERBERT HENDIN, SUICIDE IN AMERICA 245 (2d ed. 1995)
(arguing that "U]ust as love-pact suicides rarely turn out to be affirmations of love, so the self-
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Critics perceive legalization of assisted suicide as the top of a slippery slope that
would ultimately devalue human life. 44
The slippery slope theory has been refuted in part by experience in the
Netherlands, where euthanasia is accepted, though not legal.45 Dutch authorities will
not prosecute as long as three conditions are met:
First, the patient must take the initiative in requesting euthanasia and
has to request euthanasia repeatedly, consciously, and freely. Second,
the patient must be experiencing suffering that cannot be relieved by
any means except death. Third, the physician must consult with
another physician who agrees that euthanasia is acceptable in the
particular case.
46
In the Netherlands, it appears that when requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide
have been fulfilled, those requests were explicit and persistent, and rarely made
under pressure from othiers. 47
One of the primary attacks against physician-assisted suicide relates to the
doctor's perceived role as a "healer." 48 To become a physician, prospective doctors
must take the Hippocratic Oath, which states, in relevant part, "I will give no deadly
medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel." 49 Many believe that a
physician dedicated to her role as a healer cannot reconcile assisting in the death of a
patient.50 Yet doctors themselves generally support physician-assisted suicide in
sacrificial suicide may lend itself to becoming the instrument of tyranny of the healthy over the aged
and infirm"); Nancy J. Osgood, Assisted Suicide and Older People-A Deadly Combination: Ethical
Problems in Permitting Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 415, 418 (1995) (arguing that
sanctioning assisted suicide among the elderly devalues old age). But see generally GEORGE J.
ANNAS, The Insane Root Takes Reason Prisoner: The Supreme Court and the Right to Die, in
STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHIcs 85, 92 (1993) (adapted from George J.
Annas, The Long Dying of Nancy Cruzan, 19 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 52 (1991) (noting that the
"problem with the 'right to life' position is that it is exclusively a slippery-slope argument that
ignores the current rights of real people in favor of the speculative harms that may be visited on
future people").
44 See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Is There a Right to Die?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at
34, 37-38; see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
that critics of the practice believe recognizing physician-assisted suicide will eventually lead to
"court-sanctioned killing" of people deemed to pose an "unjustifiable burden on society").
45 See HENDIN, supra note 43, at 250-77; Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1896; see also van der
Maas et al., supra note 12, at 673 (finding that "physicians who had practiced euthanasia mentioned
that they would be most reluctant to do so again" and that they would only do so "in the face of
unbearable suffering and with no alternatives").
46 Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1896.
47 See van der Maas et al., supra note 12, at 672. Interviews with physicians who had practiced
euthanasia showed that in 96% of the cases, their patients had explicitly and persistently requested
assistance. See id. In 94%, the patients had made the request repeatedly. See id. In addition, 99%
of physicians reported that they felt sure the requests had not been made under pressure from others.
See id.
48 See Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1891-92.
49 HIPPOCRATES, HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS xiii (Francis Adams trans., Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc. 1952).
50 The American Medical Association (AMA) refuses to support physician-assisted suicide or
active voluntary euthanasia, on the grounds that they are "contrary to the prohibition against using
the tools of medicine to cause a patient's death." Decisions, supra note 2, at 2233. Some, however,
envision a substantially broader role for doctors near the end of their patients' lives. See, e.g.,
TIMOTHY E. QUILL, A MIDWIFE THROUGH THE DYING PROCESS 1-5 (1996).
When medicine's purpose is defined solely in terms of curing and prolonging life, there
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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AFTER LEE v. OREGON
some cases.51 Dr. Timothy Quill, for example, has used specific "sympathetic" cases
to argue that a doctor's responsibility to relieve suffering encompasses prescribing a
lethal dose of medication if necessary.52 However, some commentators question the
motives of those proposing legalization of assisted suicide.
5 3
Critics argue that our society has moved toward accepting physician-assisted
suicide primarily because it has failed to respond adequately to the needs of the
elderly, terminally ill population.5 4  They contend that given universal health
coverage, and better, more accessible hospice care, for example, people would
choose to live. 55 In this view, assisted suicide is a "quick-fix" that establishes a
dangerous precedent.
56
is no clear direction when a patient is dying. Yet, healing has more to do with caring
for the person who is ill than with simply extending biological 'life. . . .Medicine's
purpose should include helping persons become more whole and alleviating their
suffering, as well as treating their diseases.... Such is the role of a medical healer.
Id. at i.
The AMA does, however, approve of the "double effect" standard. See Decisions, supra note
2, at 2229, 2233. If a physician prescribes medication primarily to relieve a patient's pain and
suffering, then she is performing a proper medical function although she knows the patient will die
because of her actions. See id.; see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 828
n.102 (9th Cir. 1996).
Controversy surrounds this principle. George Annas argues that laws legalizing physician-
assisted suicide are unnecessary, because physicians can currently prescribe lethal medications as
long as they have "a legitimate medical use to terminally ill patients." George J. Annas, Death by
Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1240, 1242 (1994). In response, Dr.
Quill has urged that the process become more open. See Timothy E. Quill, The Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1175 (1995). He notes that the double effect would
exonerate physicians who knew their patients wanted to die, as long as the physicians intended that
the prescribed medication be used to ease pain, not to cause death. See id. "Such laws and ethical
distinctions reinforce pseudoconversations that are dangerous for patients and doctors, involving
deception and unclear thinking at a time when honesty and openness are essential." Id.
51 A recent survey found that 66% of responding Oregon-based physicians felt physician-
assisted suicide would be ethical in some cases. See Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted
Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 310, 311 (1996). A separate study
of physicians in Michigan found that fewer than 20% favored a complete ban on assisted suicide.
See Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 303, 305 (1996).
52 See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991). But see Annas, supra note 50, at 1243 (arguing that "'ideal' cases,
like that described by Quill, are an insufficient basis for changing public policy in a country where
medicine continues to be practiced in the context of bias and social inequality"). Dr. Quill has
fought to overturn laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide on constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1996); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
53 See, e.g., Kass, supra note 44, at 37 (categorizing supporters of the "right to die" as
"[c]hildren looking at parents who are not dying fast enough, hospital administrators and health
economists concerned about cost-cutting and waste, [and] doctors disgusted with caring for
incurables").
54 See, e.g., Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1895. These concerns stem in part from statistics
demonstrating that the suicide rate in the United States rises with age. See HENDIN, supra note 43,
at 81. "Persons over the age of 50, while making up 26 percent of the total United States population,
account for approximately 39 percent of the total deaths by suicide each year." Id.
55 Cf William G. Bartholome, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Hospice, and Rituals of Withdrawal,
24 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 233, 233-34 (1996) (arguing for increased use of hospice care instead of
suicide or assisted suicide).
56 However, the contention that in a world with ideal treatment options most suffering people
would choose to live, does not lead invariably to the rejection of physician-assisted suicide.
Presumably such a world would include some who would choose to die even after considering all of
their options. Cf. QUILL, supra note 50, at 4 ("The notion that all requests to physicians for assisted
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III. DO LAWS PROHIBITING ASSISTED SUICIDE IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
VIOLATE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION?
A. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY 57
Reasonable grounds exist on which a court could find that the right of privacy
extends to physician-assisted suicide.58  In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged a constitutional right of privacy, stating that matters
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the state.59
Few would dispute that death ranks among the most mysterious concepts that human
beings confront. Terminally ill patients confront death while most others in society
brush it aside. Similarly, pregnant women, by virtue of their condition, are uniquely
situated to determine whether to terminate their pregnancies. 60 Both terminally ill
patients and pregnant women must evaluate their beliefs about existence and the
mystery of human life, before acting. A broad reading of Casey suggests that a
terminally ill patient's intimate choice to receive a lethal dose of medication should
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
61
One must note, of course, that although Casey reaffirmed the "essential
holding" of Roe v. Wade,62 it also substantially narrowed that decision. 63 Under
Casey, only those state limitations that pose an "undue burden" on a protected
interest will be found unconstitutional. 64 An unduly burdensome limitation "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion." 65 Still, it remains unclear how courts should apply the "undue burden"
death stem from undertreated pain, unrecognized depression, or some kind of character flaw is an
illusion."). But cf Emanuel, supra note 28, at 1895 (arguing that even though adequate comfort
would not prevent great pain and suffering in some cases, "this does not mean [euthanasia] should be
legalized under the guise of promoting the well-being of patients in general"). By prohibiting
assisted suicide in all cases, society might "protect" those who would ideally prefer life, and work to
improve end-of-life treatment options. However, this would reject the decisions of persons who
would choose death regardless of their options, denying them the autonomy they would have
enjoyed in the more "perfect" world.
57 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
58 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the
similarities between a decision to have an abortion and a decision about how and when to die);
Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane Option, a
Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 495, 500 (1995) (arguing that no sound
basis exists for excluding physician-assisted suicide from the scope of protection defined by Casey).
59 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
60 See id. at 850-52.
61 See, e.g., Tucker & Burman, supra note 58, at 500.
62 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46, aff'g Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63 See id. at 877-79.
64 See id. at 877-78.
65 Id. at 877.
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standard outside of the abortion context. 66 Yet, assuming the existence of a liberty
interest in choosing physician-assisted suicide, one could hardly argue that a law
banning assisted suicide in all circumstances does not constitute an undue burden on
its exercise.
67
The argument in favor of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
physician-assisted suicide suffers because the purported right falls outside
boundaries of the privacy right delineated by case law. 68 The Court suggested that it
would hesitate to broaden the scope of the privacy interest beyond matters involving
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education." 69 The abortion cases and related decisions "are not intended to lead
automatically to the recognition of other fundamental rights on different subjects. '70
Recent decisions such as Casey demonstrate the U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to
expand the right of privacy beyond its current scope.
B. CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MissouRI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 71
Although the right of privacy may not include assisted suicide, a second line of
cases offers a more realistic possibility for its protection. In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the
parents of a woman who suffered an accident and had lost all cognitive abilities
could withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 72 The Missouri Supreme Court had ruled
that Nancy Cruzan's parents could not order the removal of tubes providing her with
food and hydration without clear and convincing evidence that she would have
wanted to die in such a situation. 73
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Missouri standard.74 Although
at first glance this result might have discouraged proponents of a constitutional right
to die, the decision eventually had the opposite effect. 75 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, noted that the "principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
66 See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 867, 954 (1994) ("Inconsistencies and uncertainty in the
application of the undue burden standard are unavoidable because there is no common foundation
underlying the various rights that the Constitution protects.").
67 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 832, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1996)
(describing the effect of Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide on the liberty interest of
terminally ill people in choosing the time and manner of their deaths).
68 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
69 Id. In Quill v. Koppell, the District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the
petitioners' claims that New York's prohibition of assisted suicide was contrary to the holdings of
Roe and Casey. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). The court stated that the plaintiffs' "reading of these cases is too
broad." Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83. But see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (noting
that if "the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters ... fundamentally affecting a person").
70 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83.
71 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
72 See id. at 265.
73 See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988).
74 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
75 See Kass, supra note 44, at 40.
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may be inferred from our prior decisions." 76 Perhaps, then, a "constitutional right to
die with assistance may be inferred from the Supreme Court's recognition of a
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, just as recognition of that right was
inferred from prior Court holdings."
77
A difficult yet critical question is whether the Court's assumption in Cruzan
that the U.S. Constitution "would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition," 78 includes taking active
steps to commit suicide. Many have argued that there is no significant difference
between a competent person exercising the right to refuse treatment, knowing that
such inaction will result in death, and a physician supplying a competent person with
a lethal dose of medication. 79 In both cases, a competent adult makes a decision that
eventually will lead to death. Yet a physician's assistance in achieving that death
may pose too far of a reach for the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court would likely distinguish between active and passive steps, and hold
that. physician-assisted suicide is not protected. Courts and legislatures do not
generally consider withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment suicide.8 0 In fact, the right
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and hydration developed from a historic right
to refuse treatment of any kind. 81  Because obtaining a prescription for lethal
medication from a doctor is not a refusal of treatment, the Court would likely remove
the case for physician-assisted suicide from the reach of Cruzan. The Court would
likely distinguish the act of ending life from an omission which has the same
effect.82
Justice Scalia has criticized the active-passive distinction. "It would not make
much sense to say that one may not kill oneself by walking into the sea, but may sit
on the beach until submerged by the incoming tide . . . -83 Some commentators
have agreed that no logical distinction exists between withdrawal of hydration and
76 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
77 Bjorck, supra note 9, at 390.
78 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
79 See, e.g., Tucker & Burman, supra note 58, at 502-04 (contending that the liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment cannot be distinguished from choosing to hasten inevitable
death with active medical assistance); see also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1996)
(finding one category of persons encompassing all those "in the final stages of fatal illness [who]
wish to hasten their deaths"); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Wright, J., dissenting) (stating that a "Constitutional distinction cannot be drawn between refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment and accepting physician assistance in hastening death"). But see
U.S. Supreme Court Petitioner's Brief at *7, Vacco v. Quill, 1996 WL 656345 (No. 95-1858)
(arguing that the right to forgo treatment "derives from the common law right to bodily integrity and
freedom from unwanted physical intrusions [whereas the] asserted 'right' to physician-assisted
suicide is ... a right to demand outside assistance in the taking of one's own life").
80 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (N.J. 1976) (noting "a real distinction between
the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life support . . . in the
face of irreversible, painful and certain imminent death").
81 See ANNAS, supra note 43, at 90.
82 See 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 460 (2d ed. 1995).
83 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). One may easily infer that Justice
Scalia opposes a constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide from this concurring opinion. He
questioned, are there "reasonable and humane limits that ought not to be exceeded in requiring an
individual to preserve his own life? There obviously are, but they are not set forth in the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 300.
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physician-assisted suicide.8 4 Based on its opinion in Cruzan, however, it appears
likely that the Court will make such a distinction.85 First, the Court merely assumed,
but did not hold, that competent persons have a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.8 6 If the Court either proceeds with the
same assumption, or actually holds that such a right exists, then it would have to
determine whether there is a constitutionally significant difference between
physician-assisted suicide and forgoing life-sustaining treatment. The Court
suggested its willingness to distinguish these categories when it implied that statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide are constitutional.8 7 In support of the state's interest in
preserving life, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the majority of States in this
country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit
suicide. We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an
informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."88
This statement suggests that the Court would find no constitutional infirmity in a
state's ban of assisted suicide, and must, therefore, signal the existence of a line
between a patient's right to refuse unwanted treatment and that patient's request for a
lethal prescription.8 9
C. QUILL V. VA CCO 90
In Quill v. Vacco, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
the claim that New York's prohibition of assisted suicide violated both the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.91 The
court, reversing a brief district court opinion, 92 held that with respect to competent,
terminally ill persons who request drugs from physicians to hasten their deaths, the
law violated the Equal Protection Clause. 93
The court affirmed the district court's rejection of the plaintiffs' claim that the
right to assisted suicide is a fundamental liberty under the substantive component of
the Due Process Clause. 94 The court concluded that such a right could not properly
84 See Kass, supra note 44, at 41; Tucker & Burman, supra note 58, at 503-04; see also
MEISEL, supra note 82, at 460 (arguing that "'forgoings' of life-sustaining treatment can be
accomplished either by withholding or by withdrawing, and withdrawing-for instance, the turning
off of a ventilator-is no less of an act than a self-inflicted shooting, poisoning, wrist slitting,
hanging, or even overdose of prescribed medication").
85 But see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) (assuming that persons authorized
by statute to withdraw life-sustaining treatment are similarly situated with terminally ill persons who
wish to take a lethal dose of medication).
86 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. But see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 737 (2d Cir. 1996)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (concluding that despite its use of the term, the U.S. Supreme Court "did
not merely 'assume' that a liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment existed").
87 See Edward J. Larson, Seeking Compassion in Dying: The Washington State Law Against
Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 509, 511-12 (1995).
88 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
89 See Larson, supra note 87, at 512.
90 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
91 See id. at 718. The Constitution states, in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92 See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
93 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 727.
94 See id. at 723.
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be included within the right of privacy. 95 The abortion cases, "and other related
decisions on procreation and child rearing, are not intended to lead automatically to
the recognition of other fundamental rights on different subjects." 96  The court
assumed that without support from these cases, the purported right would only be
deemed "fundamental" if it were "'deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition"' 97 or "so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that 'neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.' 98 Because the plaintiffs produced
insufficient evidence on either count, the court concluded that the case did not
involve a fundamental right,99 and therefore found no Due Process Clause
violation. 100
The Quill court instead focused on the equal protection challenge to the law
banning assisted suicide. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that states "treat in a similar manner all individuals who are similarly
situated."101 The plaintiffs based their argument on the fact that a competent person
has the right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 102 They claimed that terminally
95 See id. at 724 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
96 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83.
97 Quill, 80 F.3d at 723 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
98 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
99 See id. at 724. Contrary to the court's suggestion, history does not conclusively scorn
suicide. For example, in 1789, David Hume wrote:
That suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves, no
one can question, who allows that age, sickness, or misfortune may render life a
burden, and make it worse even than annihilation. I believe that no man ever threw
away life while it was worth keeping.
David Hume, An Essay on Suicide, in DAVID HUME: SELECTED ESSAYs 315, 323 (Stephen Copley &
Andrew Edgar eds., 1993).
100 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 724-25. However, because the court employed oversimplified
analysis, we cannot learn much from the due process discussion in Quill. First, the court incorrectly
assumed that only a state's interference with a fundamental right may lead to a violation of the Due
Process Clause. Cf. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the Supreme Court's "evolving doctrinal approach" has led it to speak of "substantive due
process interests" rather than "fundamental due process rights" in recent years). In both Casey and
Cruzan, for example, the Court balanced nonfundamental liberty interests against legitimate state
interests. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992);
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990). In Casey, the joint
opinion used a test whereby an "undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if
its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability." Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
The Court also overemphasized the importance of historical sanction in judging whether a
right is fundamental. In Casey, the Court noted that making historical approval a prerequisite to
constitutional protection would be
inconsistent with our law .... Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and
interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no
doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected by the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
101 Quill, 80 F.3d at 725; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The court concluded that people
who could refuse lifesaving treatment and people who wished a physician's aid in suicide were
similarly situated. See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729. These two groups together constituted "competent
persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths." Id. at 727.
102 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-79 (McKinney 1993); Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp.
78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. Life-sustaining treatment includes
"mechanical ventilation, renal dialysis, chemotherapy, antibiotics, and artificial nutrition and
hydration." Decisions, supra note 2, at 2229.
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ill patients seeking physicians' aid in hastening death were similarly situated, and
that the state had no justification for treating them differently.103
States that treat similarly situated people differently subject themselves to
various levels of judicial scrutiny.104 The court determined that rational basis review
was the appropriate standard in evaluating laws prohibiting assisted suicide. 05 Like
other social welfare legislation, this law would pass judicial scrutiny if the
classification drawn rationally furthered a legitimate state purpose. 106
The court concluded that the distinction failed to pass even the low level of
scrutiny imposed by rational basis review.1 07 The court held that "to the extent that
the statutes in question prohibit persons in the final stages of terminal illness from
having assistance in ending their lives by the use of self-administered, prescribed
drugs, the statutes lack any rational basis and are violative of the Equal Protection
Clause." 0 8
Certain aspects of Quill are problematic. First, the court's basis for its
conclusion that those who may remove life-sustaining treatment are similarly
situated to those who wish to obtain a lethal prescription was mistaken. The district
court ruled that "[i]n any event, it is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the State to
recognize a difference between allowing nature to take its course, even in the most
severe situations, and intentionally using an artificial death-producing device."109
The Second Circuit criticized this view, reasoning that both situations involve active
steps to hasten death."o
By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial life-sustaining
processes or refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient hastens
his death by means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly cannot
be said that the death that immediately ensues is the natural result of
the progression of the disease or condition from which the patient
suffers. ' I I
One could, however, legitimately view the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as
"letting nature take its course." If no technology existed to keep the patient alive,
then the disease already would have caused that person's death. Adding a respirator
can be seen as an artificial delay in the natural course of dying.12
Even if the physical act of "pulling the plug" is unnatural in some respects, it
differs significantly from obtaining a doctor's prescription for a lethal dose of
medication. The U.S. Constitution protects the right to refuse treatment, including
cases where the refusal will result in death, but no corresponding right exists to
103 See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84.
104 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 725-27.
105 See id. at 726.
106 See id. (citing Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985)).
107 See id. at 727.
108 Id.
109 Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
I1O See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
1II Id.
112 The AMA apparently supports this interpretation. See Decisions, supra note 2, at 2229. It
defines treatment as "life-sustaining" when it "serves to prolong life without reversing the
underlying medical condition." Id.
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obtain "treatment" such as a lethal dose of medication.1 13 "Americans have never
been obligated to accept any or all manner of medical treatment available to prolong
life; the essence of the legal right at stake is the right to be free from unwanted
bodily invasions."
' 14
The withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment should not, therefore, be classified
as suicide. Rather, death results from the disease which prompted medical care
initially. Physician-assisted suicide causes a person who would otherwise have lived
without any medical attention to die. It is a form of suicide. As physician-assisted
suicide may properly be seen as suicide, and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
may not, the court erred by finding them to be similarly situated.
D. COMPASSION IN DYING V. WASHINGTON 115
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the plaintiffs-four physicians, three
terminally ill patients and a non-profit organization--challenged the constitutionality
of Washington's statute prohibiting assisted suicide." 6 The law provides that a
''person is guilty of promoting a suicide when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide." 117 The district court saw Casey as "almost prescriptive"
in finding a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide." 8 The court concluded that
"the suffering of a terminally ill person cannot be deemed any less intimate or
personal, or any less deserving of protection from unwarranted governmental
interference, than that of a pregnant woman." 119 As such, the choice of whether to
commit physician-assisted suicide resides with those liberties protected by the U.S.
Constitution. 20 Because Washington unequivocally prohibits assisted suicide, the
court declared that the law unduly burdened the exercise of competent, terminally ill
persons' rights to exercise a protected liberty interest.
1 21
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning:
To take three sentences out of an opinion over thirty pages in length
dealing with the highly charged subject of abortion and to find these
sentences "almost prescriptive" in ruling on a statute proscribing the
promotion of suicide is to make an enormous leap, to do violence to the
context, and to ignore the differences between the regulation of
reproduction and the prevention of the promotion of killing a patient at
113 See George J. Annas, The Promised End-Constitutional Aspects of Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 683, 684 (1996).
114 Id.
115 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
116 See id. at 794.
117 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1991). Violating the statute constitutes a
felony punishable by up to five years in prison, and a $10,000 fine. See id. §§ 9A.36.060(2),
.20.020(1)(c).
The plaintiffs did not object to the portion of the statute that makes it unlawful for a person to
cause" someone to commit suicide. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 797. They challenged the
"or aids" portion of the statute both on its face and as applied to mentally competent, terminally ill
adults who wish to hasten their deaths with the help of medication prescribed by their doctors. See
id.
118 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-60 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
119 Id. at 1460.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 1465.
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. his or her request. 122
The court distinguished Casey,123 and found no constitutional violations in
Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide.124  Citing its "extraordinary
importance," the Ninth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc. 125
The court first considered whether a liberty interest exists in "choosing the time
and manner of one's death-a question sometimes phrased in common parlance as:
Is there a right to die?"'126 According to the court, the range of liberties guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause reside on a "'rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints.'- 1 27
The court examined historical and current perspectives, noting that at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, only nine out of thirty-seven states had
statutory prohibitions of assisted suicide. 128 Today, most Americans favor legalized
physician-assisted suicide.129 However, the court relied primarily on case law,
especially Casey and Cruzan, to find a liberty interest in choosing the time and
manner of death. 130
Extrapolating from language in Casey, the court noted that like "the decision of
whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice
'central to personal dignity and autonomy."131 Like abortion, choosing to "die with
dignity" implicates a vital liberty interest.13 2
In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that "[t]he principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."133 Refusing
unwanted care includes the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, a course of
action that necessarily induces the patient's death.134 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes refusal of life-sustaining
treatment, must also recognize a liberty interest in hastening one's own death.135
122 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1995).
123 See id. at 590-91.
124 See id. at 594.
125 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) (granting a rehearing
en banc); see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996)
(commenting that the rehearing had been granted because of the case's "extraordinary importance").
126 Id. at 798-99. The liberty interest is not in "committing suicide," but in "controlling the
time and manner of one's death," because the interest encompasses a broader range of activities than
suicide, including the act of refusing or terminating unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 802.
127 Id. at 800 (quoting Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The
court did not consider whether the interests involved rose to the level of "fundamental rights." See
id. at 803-04.
128 See id. at 809. The court noted generally that "while historical analysis plays a useful role
in any attempt to determine whether a claimed right or liberty interest exists, earlier legislative or
judicial recognition of the right or interest is not a sine qua non." Id. at 805.
129 See id. at 810.
130 See id. at 813; see also Euthanasia Favored in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1991, at A 16.
131 Id. at 813-14 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
132 See id. at 814.
133 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
134 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 815-16.
135 See id. at 816.
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After finding a liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's
death, the court considered whether the state's prohibition of assisted suicide
impermissibly burdened that interest with respect to competent, terminally ill adults
wishing to hasten their deaths.' 3 6 The court rejected the dissent's contention that
state actions are subject to a rational basis test when the liberty interest involved does
not rise to the level of a fundamental right.'37 Applying a balancing test, the court
stated that as long as the "liberty interest is an important one, the state must shoulder
the burden of justifying any significant limitations it seeks to impose."'
138
The court examined each of the state's legitimate interests and concluded that
none outweighed the liberty interest previously identified.' 39 For example, although
the state has an unqualified interest in preserving life, including the lives of
terminally ill adults, the strength of that interest fluctuates from case to case. 140 The
state's interest decreases when patients cannot pursue happiness or liberty, and no
longer wish to live. 141 "Thus, while the state may still seek to prolong the lives of
terminally ill ... patients or, more likely, to enact regulations that will safeguard the
manner in which decisions to hasten death are made, the strength of the state's
interest is substantially reduced in such circumstances."
1 42
Like the preservation of life, the strength of the state's interest in preventing
suicide diminishes in the case of competent, terminally ill adults who wish to die.'
43
Unlike others who may wish to commit suicide, people with terminal illnesses
cannot be cured, and frequently cannot find any enjoyment in life. 144 "Not only is
the state's interest in preventing such individuals from hastening their deaths of
comparatively little weight, but its insistence on frustrating their wishes seems cruel
indeed."145
The state also has an interest in protecting infirm, elderly persons from undue
pressure to end their lives from callous, financially burdened, or self-interested
relatives, or others with influence over them.' 46 The court noted, however, 'that
knowledge of a person's impending death will ordinarily restrain the temptation to
exert undue pressure. 147 The court acknowledged that some terminally ill adults
136 See id.
137 See id. at 804.
138 Id. According to the court, the strength of the liberty interest fluctuates depending on
certain factors, especially the individual's physical condition. See id. at 834. "When a mentally
competent adult is terminally ill and wishes, free of any coercion, to hasten his death because his
remaining days are an unmitigated torture, that person's liberty interest is at its height." Id.
139 See id. at 836-37.
140 See id. at 817.
141 See id. at 820.
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 820-21.
145 Id. at 821. The court noted that the state's interest in preventing suicide may not even be
implicated in this case. See id. at 824. Notwithstanding the use of the term "physician-assisted
suicide," the court found no significant difference between the prescription of a lethal dose of
medication and a patient's decision to terminate life support or refuse food and hydration (actions
which the state does not consider to be "suicide"). See id.
146 See id. at 826.
147 See id.
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might request the lethal dose of medication to protect their families from the expense
of prolonged medical treatment.1 48 However, although
state regulations can help ensure that patients do not make rash,
uninformed, or ill considered decisions, we are reluctant to say that, in
a society in which the costs of protracted health care can be so
exorbitant, it is improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the
economic welfare of their families and loved ones into consideration.
49
The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical
profession, an interest that prevents physicians from engaging in conduct at odds
with their role as healers.' 50 This should not prevent physicians from providing
lethal medication, however. Instead, "it is the existence of a statute that criminalizes
the provision of medical assistance to patients in need that could create conflicts with
the doctors' professional obligations and make covert criminals out of honorable,
dedicated, and compassionate individuals."'' I In addition, many physicians have
discretely aided terminally ill patients to hasten death for decades, without
compromising their ethical standards or the reputation of the medical profession.
52
In applying the balancing test, the court considered not only the state's
legitimate interests, but also the means by which they had been implemented.
53
Without denying the importance of the state's purposes, the court decried the
harshness of an outright prohibition of assisted suicide.154 The state could satisfy its
interests more fairly by establishing "appropriate, reasonable, and properly drawn
safeguards" to assure the competency of the person requesting lethal medication. 
55
Given that the "liberty interest in hastening death is at its strongest when the
state's interest in protecting life and preventing suicide is at its weakest, and vice-
versa," the court concluded that the state could not constitutionally prohibit
consenting, terminally ill adults from choosing physician-assisted suicide.' 56 The
court held that "a liberty interest exists in the choice of how and when one dies, and
that the provision of the Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to
competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors, violates the Due Process Clause."' 157
If affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Compassion in Dying would have vast implications. Within the Ninth Circuit, the
decision would render all state laws unequivocally banning assisted suicide
inapplicable to competent, terminally ill patients. In addition, the ruling would
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 827.
151 Id. But see Decisions, supra note 2, at 2232 (condemning "the gradual distortion of the role
of medicine into something that starkly contrasts with the current vision of a profession dedicated to
healing and comforting").
152 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 828; see also supra notes 50-5 1.
153 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832.
154 See id.
155 Id. at 833. The court noted some potential procedural safeguards, "without endorsing
[their] constitutionality." Id. Examples included witnesses to ensure voluntariness, short waiting
periods to prevent impulsive decisions and psychological evaluations to guarantee that the patient
does not suffer from treatable depression. See id.
156 Id. at 836-37.
157 Id. at 838.
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reverse Lee v. Oregon, in which the District Court of Oregon ruled that an Oregon
initiative which would have allowed physician-assisted suicide in certain
circumstances violated the Equal Protection Clause.1
58
IV. LEGALIZED ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES
Oregon voters were not the first to consider a variation of the Death with
Dignity Act. Washington's ballot initiative was defeated by a margin of fifty-four to
forty-six percent in 1991.159 The Washington act, similar in many respects to
Oregon's Measure 16, would have allowed mentally "competent" patients with
terminal conditions to request physician-assisted "aid in dying."160  Some
commentators suggest that voters rejected the measure because it neither set forth
sufficiently specific procedures for implementing the "aid in dying," nor did it
adequately define the physician's role.'61 However, the Act's scope apparently
included both voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.' 62 Despite its
vagueness, the initiative "quantified the level of public support for assistance in
dying and also provided the impetus for similar legislation in California."163
B. THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed
his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for
the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner
in accordance with this act.1
64
Measure 16 sets forth various requirements and safeguards for physician-assisted
suicide.1 65 "Terminal disease" is defined as "an incurable and irreversible disease
that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment,
158 See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995). Although the expected appeal
of Lee was not at issue here, the court described the holding reached in that case as "highly
irregular," and noted that Chief Judge Hogan, author of the Lee opinion, had "clearly erred." See
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838.
159 See Cheryl K. Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 503,
503 (1993).
160 See Jody B. Gabel, Release From Terminal Suffering?: The Impact of AIDS on Medically
Assisted Suicide Legislation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369, 411 (1994) (citing the proposed
amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.060(1) (1991), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, VOTERS PAMPHLET, Initiative Measure 119, at 29).
161 See id. at 413.
162 See Annas, supra note 50, at 1240. "Euthanasia and assisted suicide differ in the degree of
physician participation. Euthanasia entails a physician performing the immediate life-ending ac-
tion . . . .Assisted suicide occurs when a physician facilitates a patient's death by providing the
necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the life-ending act." Decisions,
supra note 2, at 2229.
163 Gabel, supra note 160, at 413.
164 Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.805, § 2.01 (1995).
165 See id. chs. 127.800-.897.
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produce death within six (6) months."' 66 Requests for medication must be witnessed
by two individuals who attest that the patient is "capable, acting voluntarily, and is
not being coerced to sign the request."' 167 The attending physician is required to
determine whether the patient has a terminal disease, and has made a voluntary
request for medication.1 68 The physician must also inform the patient of alternatives
to suicide, refer the patient to a consulting physician for a mandatory second opinion
for confirmation of the original diagnosis and refuse to give the patient the lethal
medication if it appears that he or she suffers from a psychological disorder or
depression causing impaired judgment. 69 Clearly, the drafters of Measure 16
intended to shield doctors and patients from possible abuses of the system.17
0
However, in invalidating Measure 16, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon noted that its protections against abuses of the system were inadequate.'17 In
particular, the court took issue with the "imprecision and inadequacy of protections
leading to the prescription of drugs."' 172  Although Measure 16 sets forth the
conditions under which a person will receive the medication, it does not require the
recipient to take the medication at any particular time or place, and does not demand
supervision.173 This leaves the potential for people who physicians deem competent
at the time they prescribe the medication to suffer undue influence at some later
point. The "relationship between Measure 16's classification and the goal of
permitting assisted suicide is too attenuated without some protection at the time of
taking the fatal drug dosage."' 174
C. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MEASURE 16
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
In Lee v. Oregon, Judge Hogan held that Measure 16 violates the Equal
Protection Clause, because it denies the terminally ill the same protection against
suicide afforded the remainder of Oregon's citizens. 175- The court found no rational
relation between Measure 16's denial of protection to depressed, terminally ill
166 Id. ch. 127.800, § 1.01(12).
167 Id. ch. 127.810(1), § 2.02(1).
168 See id. ch. 127.815, § 3.01.
169 See id. ch. 127.815, § 3.01(2)-(3); id. ch. 127.825, § 3.03. Critics of legalized assisted
suicide argue that physicians would be unable to make accurate psychological evaluations. See
HENDIN, supra note 43, at 243. This might be critical, assuming that, "like other suicidal
individuals, patients who desire an early death during a terminal illness [usually suffer] from a
treatable mental illness, most commonly a depressive condition." Id. at 242-43. According to Dr.
Hendin, a "thorough psychiatric evaluation for the presence of a treatable disorder may literally
make a life or death difference for patients who say they wish to die or to have a physician help them
to do so." Id. at 243. These observations do not justify the continued prohibition of assisted
suicide. They do, however, counsel in favor of supplementing existing safeguards with mandatory
psychiatric evaluation.
170 Drafters of Measure 16 expected its enactment in part because its scope was more limited
than failed initiatives in California and Washington. See Annas, supra note 50, at 1241.
171 See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995).
172 Id.
173 See id.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 1438.
HeinOnline -- 23 Am. J.L. & Med. 87 1997
- I    87 
  t s."166 ti   
 le,   
 t."167   
i  l ,  
t . 168    
,    
     
ti    i l  
i    169   
ti t  fr  i l  s s f t e syste . 170 
  , ·  f 
 i    .!71  
t i i   ti s 
  ."172 ~!i  
  ti :  
ti    
173 sid  t t 
i     
ip   i i tion  f 
 t   ti  f 
 t  f t l r  sa e."174 
   
  
  . .  
on,   
  r   t 
 's l75   
  ll   
1661d. ch. 127.800, § 1.0 I (12). 
1671d. ch. 127.810(1), § 2.02(1). 
168 See id. ch. 127.815, § 3.01. 
169 See id. ch. 127.815, § 3.01(2)-(3); id. ch. 127.825, § 3.03. Critics of legalized assisted 
l i l  
,  , l, .  
l ,    
 iti ." l .  
i ,  t  i t i  l ti   t     t t l     
  li   t  i   ti t      t  i   t       
t   s .  l . t .  r ti   t j tif  t  ti  r i iti   i t  
.   
i t i  l ti . 
170 Drafters of Measure 16 expected its enactment in part because its scope was more limited 
   i    i t .   , . 
171 See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995). 
172 [d. 
173 See id. 
41  
175 See id. at 1438. 
88 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. XXIII NO. 1 1997
people from their suicidal impulses and the state's interests. 176 The reasoning behind
the court's conclusion provides an opportunity to test its equal protection analysis.
Courts choose among levels of scrutiny when considering cases that implicate
the Equal Protection, Clause.177 If the statute is based on a "suspect classification"'
178
such as race or national origin; or if it restricts a "fundamental" right such as the
right to procreate or the right to vote, 179 strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of
review. A law passes strict scrutiny when it is necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest.' 8 0
If the law fails to affect a suspect class of persons or restrict a fundamental
right, then courts will generally apply a rational relation test, under which legislation
is presumed valid if "a classification drawn by a statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."' 8 1  The court purported to use the rational relation test
because the "terminally ill" is an ordinary (not "suspect") classification. 8 2  A
classification rationally furthers a state interest when there is some fit between the
disparate treatment and the legislative purpose.' 83 A classification cannot fail the
rational relation test "so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented to
the [lawmaker] ... that the question is at least debatable.'
'
9
184
Appropriate equal protection analysis therefore requires a judicial
determination both of the legitimacy of a state's interest, and of the means the state
chose to effectuate its goal. 8 5 Oregon claimed the following interests in allowing
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill:
(1) avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering; (2) preserving and
enhancing the right of competent adults to make their own critical
health care decisions; (3) avoiding tragic cases of attempted or
successful suicides in a less humane and dignified manner; (4)
protecting the terminally ill and their loved ones from financial
hardships they wish to avoid; and (5) protecting the terminally ill and
their loved ones from unwanted intrusions into their personal affairs by
law enforcement officers and others.186
176 See id. at 1437.
177 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985)
(discussing standards of scrutiny employed by courts to determine state legislation's validity under
an equal protection challenge).
178 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (holding that
discrimination against any racial group merits strict scrutiny).
179 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668, 670 (1966) (holding that poll
taxes restrict the fundamental right to vote, and thus violate the equal protection clause).
180 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
181 Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437; see Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (stating that
the Court has required legislation which classifies groups of people to be, at a minimum, rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective).
182 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431 n.2.
183 See id. at 1432.
184 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quoting United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938)).
185 It is irrelevant for the purposes of constitutional analysis that the public enacted Measure 16
by referendum, as opposed to traditional legislative process. See Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
186 Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434. Measure 16 would limit the right to receive a lethal dose of
medication to those with fewer than six months to live. See Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT.
ch. 127.800, § 1.01; id. ch. 127.805, § 2.01. Some of the Measure's proponents would eventually
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The Oregon court made no finding that any of the state's interests were
illegitimate.' 87 Under rational basis review, the court next moved to the fit between
the means employed by Measure 16 and the state's legitimate interests. 188
The court employed faulty reasoning in reaching its conclusion that no rational
relation existed between the classification drawn and the legitimate state interests.
The court misinterpreted the means employed to further the end involved. Measure
16 intended to grant the right of physician-assisted suicide to competent, terminally
ill people to further the goal of preventing suffering, among other things.'
89
However, the court analyzed the classification in an entirely different light,
considering Measure 16 together with Oregon's law prohibiting assisted suicide
generally.190 The court then declared that the primary purpose of that statute was to
protect the population against suicide. 19 1  As such, Measure 16 served as an
exception to Oregon's prohibition against assisted suicide, denying the terminally ill
the same protection from suicide that the rest of the population enjoyed.' 92 From this
perspective, it becomes somewhat easier to understand the court's conclusion that no
rational relation existed in this case. Denying the terminally ill protection from their
suicidal impulses may not relate closely to a state goal of preventing suffering, or
enhancing the rights of competent adults to make critical health care decisions.
Underlying the court's decision is the notion that Oregon's prohibition of
assisted suicide is based on interests in the "preservation of life and protection
extend the privilege to all consenting adults, a fact that did not escape the court's notice. See Lee,
891 F. Supp. at 1432. Judge Hogan, while purporting to analyze the relevant constitutional issues in
the context of the much smaller class defined in the statute, seemed concerned about a slippery
slope:
While a diagnosis of terminal illness with less that [sic] six months to live may be a
persuasive rational basis for some to choose suicide, there is little limit to the
justifications which can be advanced for state-sanctioned suicide. Where in the
Constitution do we find distinctions between the terminally ill with six months to live,
the terminally ill with one year to live, paraplegics, the disabled, or any category of
people who have their own reasons for not wanting to continue living?
Id. at 1432 n.3. Although such considerations may concern the court, potential future classifications
should not have interfered with its equal protection analysis of the classification as drawn.
187 See id. at 1434-37 (noting that the act furthers asserted state interests, but holding equal
protection violation based on "severely overinclusive class").
188 See id. at 1434.
189 See id. Consideration of Measure 16 as denying a right to a particular group is suspicious,
because the law was obviously intended to grant an additional right to that class. Equal protection
analysis based on the classification as obviously intended by the electorate (granting a right to
competent, terminally ill people) shows more than a mere rational relation to the goal of preventing
suffering. Fifty-two percent of Oregon voters believed in the strength of the connection. See
Caplan, supra note 11, at 3.
190 See id. at 1433-34; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 163.117 (1995) (providing "aiding
commission of suicide" as a defense to murder, but not to manslaughter or other crimes).
191 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434. Judge Hogan seems to premise his ruling on the idea that
laws banning assisted suicide actually prevent people from committing suicide: "Measure 16 singles
out terminally ill persons who want to commit suicide and excludes them from the protection of
Oregon laws that apply to others." Id. at 1438. However, approximately 15 states do not criminalize
assisted suicide, seemingly with negligible impact. See MEISEL, supra note 82, at 478.
192 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit
rejected Judge Hogan's reasoning on this point: "The benefit we conclude the terminally ill are
entitled to receive in this case-the right to physician-assisted suicide-is precisely what Judge
Hogan determined to be a burden and thus unlawful. In short, Lee treats a burden as a benefit and a
benefit as a burden. In doing so, Judge Hogan clearly erred." 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996).
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against suicide."' 193 Yet, as previously noted, laws against assisted suicide derive
from English common law, 194 which was largely based on religious ideology. 195
Christianity condemns suicide as self-murder, and a direct contradiction of the Sixth
Commandment decree that "[t]hou shalt not kill."196 Clearly, state laws which
criminalize assisted suicide are based on moral and religious beliefs,197 rather than
concern that without such laws, incompetent or severely depressed persons may be
more likely to kill themselves. Even if we assume, however, that underlying the
prohibition of assisted suicide is protection of citizens from taking their lives, the
district court's ruling appears faulty.
The court declared that "[i]t is 'rational' to conclude that competent terminally
ill persons may not want protection from their suicidal impulses."198 Although
Measure 16 tailored its classification to competent adults, the court found
insufficient safeguards in the competency determination.199 Central to the court's
ruling is its concern that Measure 16 would not prevent mentally incompetent,
terminally ill patients from committing suicide.200 The court stated that suicide is an
improper alternative whenever patients suffer from treatable depression or mental
illness.201
Because certain terminally ill patients may wish to commit suicide because of
impaired judgment due to treatable depression, the court reasoned that the state
failed to serve its interest in enhancing personal autonomy in health care decision
making. 202 The state had argued that because the right to assisted suicide applies
only to "competent" adults, the danger of mentally disturbed terminally ill patients
receiving the medication is reduced. 203 Under Measure 16, the patient's request for
the medication must be witnessed by at least two individuals who attest that "to the
best of their knowledge and belief the patient is capable, acting voluntarily, and is
193 Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434.
194 See Mary M. Penrose, Assisted Suicide: A Tough Pill to Swallow, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 689, 701
(1993).
195 See id. at 696-700.
196 Exodus 20:13. "Although most interpreters agree that the Sixth Commandment apparently
is not a direct mandate against suicide, the implication is that suicide is analogous to homicide, and
therefore is similarly covered by the Sixth Commandment's mandate against killing." Penrose,
supra note 194, at 696 n.41. Both Judaism and Islam parallel ideology of the Catholic Church,
rejecting suicide as direct taking of human life. See Mangini, supra note 36, at 736-37.
197 See generally Penrose, supra note 194, at 696 (noting that the religious influence of the
Catholic Church "is certain to pervade the assisted suicide debate in a similar manner" to that of the
abortion debate). These laws stem from the idea that "[e]veryone has a moral duty to respect the
sanctity of human life, that is, to refrain from any act that can reasonably be expected to cause
another human being's death." BURTON M. LEISER, LIBERTY, JUSTICE, AND MORALS:
CONTEMPORARY VALUE CONFLICTS 107 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing abortion laws).
198 Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 1433.
201 See id. at 1434.
202 See id. at 1433.
203 See id. at 1434. The court's references to "incompetent" individuals parallel Measure 16's
use of the word "incapable," meaning that when "in the opinion of the court or in the opinion of the
patient's attending physician or consulting physician, a patient lacks the ability to make and
communicate health care decisions to health care providers, including communication through
persons familiar with the patient's manner of communicating if those persons are available." Death
with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.800, § 1.01(6).
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not being coerced to sign the request." 20 4 In addition, the first attending physician
must make an "initial determination of whether a patient ... is capable."
205 After the
determination is made, the first attending physician must refer the patient to a
"consulting physician" for "medical confirmation of the diagnosis, and for a
determination that the patient is capable."
206
Either the attending or the consulting physician may, "if appropriate," refer the
patient for counseling. 20 7 Measure 16 makes clear that "[n]o medication to end a
patient's life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person
performing the counseling determines that the patient is not suffering from a
psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment."
208
Despite these protections, the court reasoned that some mentally incompetent,
terminally ill patients would "slip through the cracks" and receive the lethal
medication because the "procedures designed to differentiate between the competent
and incompetent are not sufficient." 209 This occurs primarily because the physicians
charged with making such judgments may not have sufficient training.
210 The court
noted that under "Measure 16, a treating physician must determine when a person is
beyond help and not merely suffering from treatable depression common in people
with terminal illnesses."
211
Basing a competency decision on whether a person is suffering from treatable
depression "common in people with terminal illnesses" may be problematic. It
seems reasonable to expect that persons diagnosed with a terminal disease will be
depressed.212 It does not follow, however, that the state should prevent them from
receiving the lethal dose of medication. It is less likely that a person completely at
ease with his or her illness will take advantage of physician-assisted suicide. For this
reason, the drafters of Measure 16 probably meant to include only the truly
despondent and irrational, rather than persons with treatable depression, in the Act's
definition of those for whom "depression caus[es] impaired judgment."
213 Yet
because of its perceived inadequacies, the court determined that the classification
drawn ("terminally ill" patients) was overinclusive.
214
The court may have correctly found Measure 16 overinclusive. It is possible to
imagine that the attending and consulting physicians might prescribe lethal
medication after mistakenly assessing the patient's competency. However, the court
describes the class as defined by Measure 16 as "severely overinclusive."
2 15
Although some individuals within the classification should not receive the
medication, the court fails to cite evidence that this subgroup composes more than
204 OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.810, § 2.02(1).
205 Id. ch. 127.815, § 3.01(1).
206 Id. § 3.01(3).
207 See id. § 3.01(4).
208 Id. ch. 127.825, § 3.03.
209 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (D. Or. 1995).
210 See id. at 1435.
211 Id.
212 See id. (noting that "seriously ill people commonly suffer from alienation, guilt and feelings
of unworthiness").
213 See OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.825, § 3.03.
214 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
215 See id.
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the tiniest fraction of the "terminally ill."216 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, "it is of no constitutional significance
that the degree of rationality is not as great with respect to certain ill-defined
subparts of the classification as it is with respect to the classification as a whole." 217
Given the deferential nature of rational basis review, the court should have upheld
Measure 16 against the equal protection challenge.
The Lee v. Oregon opinion suggested an interesting question: whether a more
appropriate equal protection analysis would focus on the denial of the right of
assisted suicide to citizens of Oregon other than the terminally ill.218 "While the
practical effect of a state law may be to create some inequality between particular
classes of persons . . . , it cannot create an illusory classification where the reasons
for the law apply equally to all members of the public." 219 If Measure 16 rests on
notions of autonomy, then all citizens should enjoy the right to physician-assisted
suicide. 220 Of course, this argument could not advance far, given the current state of
public opinion today.221
216 See id. The court only states that "Measure 16 provides a means to commit suicide to a
severely overinclusive class who may be competent, incompetent, unduly influenced or abused by
others." Id.
217 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979); see also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096,
2101 (1993) (holding that a classification "must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that state legislation
"does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications [it makes] are
imperfect").
218 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438 (suggesting that one of the problems with Measure 16 is its
inability to limit "rational suicide" to the hard cases). "The suffering of some competent, terminally
ill persons gives rise to compassionate arguments." Id.
219 Id. at 1433.
220 A response to this argument is that the reasons for Measure 16 do not apply equally to all
citizens. Principal interests cited in creating an exception for terminally ill patients under Measure
16 include avoiding "unnecessary pain and suffering," and protecting "the terminally ill and their
loved ones from financial hardships." Id. at 1434. Certainly these interests are particular to the
class of persons the measure intended to help.
221 Consider an editorial written shortly after Judge Hogan's decision:
Do you suppose that dying Oregonians, fighting the pain of cancer or the indignities of
dependency, are relieved to know that a federal judge doesn't want them discriminated
against? . . . The ruling is an appalling commentary on the strange twist the
discrimination argument has taken. Next thing you know, Oregonians who do not have
a terminal disease will claim that the law discriminates against them because they don't
have the right to get a doctor to help them die.
Dying and Discrimination: Death with Dignity Case Misconstrues the Issue, PEORIA J. STAR, Aug.
15, 1995, at A4. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), the court derided the possibility:
If at the heart of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is this uncurtailable
ability to believe and to act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to suicide and
the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of at least every sane adult. The
attempt to restrict such rights to the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exists in
this context . . . every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it. . . . The
conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum.
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D. WHETHER MEASURE 16 VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although the district court in Lee declined to address the plaintiffs due process
claim, 222 it must receive judicial attention before any'law allowing assisted suicide
becomes effective. The reviewing court should employ'rational basis review for
those acts that do not materially impair a fundamental right.223 Under rational basis
review, a law does not violate due process if the court determines that it rationally
relates to a legitimate government interest. 224 The court's disposition of the equal
protection challenge demonstrates that Measure 16 implicates no fundamental
right.225 As such, courts generally defer to legislative judgment.
226
The plaintiffs claim that the rights of depressed, terminally ill people "are
affected adversely by allowing assisted suicide without creating adequate safeguards
to protect them from self-harm." 227 As in the context of equal protection, the state
would respond that the law protects such individuals through its process of screening
out those thought to be incompetent. However, in Lee, the court found such
procedures would not protect the lives of depressed, terminally ill people.
228 If
swayed by reasoning employed in Lee, the reviewing court would likely declare that
Measure 16 violates the due process rights of the incompetent, terminally ill.229
E. OVERCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES BY MODIFYING MEASURE 16
If eventually struck down, Measure 16 should be re-drafted, addressing Judge
Hogan's concerns. Changes would alleviate the court's fear that people with
treatable depression might receive the lethal medication. First, drafters should add
protections to ensure that only truly competent individuals utilize physician-assisted
suicide. Judge Hogan noted that Oregon law authorizes the civil commitment of
mentally ill persons who endanger themselves in some way.230 A treating physician
licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners would have the authority to hold
individuals in a health care facility until a judge appoints a qualified examiner to
evaluate the patient. 2 3 1 The Lee court also suggested that Measure 16 require that
"the person consult a certified social worker or other specialist to explore social
222 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
223 Fundamental rights are those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
224 See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (holding that regulations limiting
policemen's hair length were reasonable).
225 See supra text accompanying notes 185-92.
226 See, e.g., Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245 (noting that if state regulations survive challenges based
on the "explicit language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive
regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the
substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
227 Kathy T. Graham, Last Rights: Oregon's New Death with Dignity Act, 31 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 601, 628 (1995).
228 See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1435-37 (D. Or. 1995).
229 But see Graham, supra note 227, at 630 (arguing that if "Oregon voters want to protect
these rights, individual plaintiffs should not be allowed to subvert them").
230 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1435; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 426.070(5)(b)(A) (1995).
231 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434. It is not entirely clear in what way a treating physician
better serves the goal of assessing a patient's competency than the attending and consulting
physicians under Measure 16. Presumably, the treating physician would be more familiar with the
patient's condition, and should therefore have some insight into how to judge her decision to die.
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services which might assist the person to live in greater comfort." 232 Although this
further requirement may temporarily frustrate competent individuals who have
decided to die, it may also help to ensure that all those contemplating their options
have the information necessary to make an informed choice. A mandatory session
with a mental health professional would protect those that attending and consulting
physicians might otherwise incorrectly classify as competent.
Another of the court's concerns focused on a physician's duty under Measure
16.233 Although doctors generally must treat patients with the same diligence and
expertise as other doctors in similar circumstances, Measure 16 provides immunity
to any physician who "participates in good faith . . . with this act." 234 This could
conceivably allow the physician to "negligently misdiagnose a person's condition
and competency and negligently prescribe a drug overdose, so long as those actions
are in 'good faith."' 235 Removing the good faith provision would bring Measure 16
in !ine with the accepted standard of care, and should further alleviate the court's
concern.
Perhaps the most significant modification suggested by the court's opinion in
Lee relates to Measure 16's lack of safeguards at the time the patient ingests the
medication. 236 At that moment, the patient's decision to take the lethal medication
must be rational and voluntary. 237 A modified statute could require a physician's
attendance at the time the patient takes his or her life. Or it could mandate that the
patient take the medication immediately on receipt of the drugs. Either way, the
modification would make the Death with Dignity Act more sensitive to curtailing
undue influence by third parties. 238
The perceived inadequacies of Measure 16 led the Lee court to conclude that
"Measure 16 provides a means to commit suicide to a severely overinclusive class
who may be competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused by others." 239 By
tightening those portions of the statute designed to guarantee that only appropriately
trained professionals contribute to the prescription of lethal doses of medication to
truly competent persons, courts should no longer find such laws constitutionally
deficient. 240
V. CONCLUSIONS
It might well turn out that courts will be more willing to uphold the
constitutionality of legislation, such as Oregon's, that partially decrim-
232 Id. "With death at issue under Measure 16, the court is unable to conceive of a set of facts
under which it would be rational to not require mental and social evaluations by appropriately
trained professionals." Id. at 1436.
233 See id. at 1436-37.
234 Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885.
235 Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 Id.
240 The argument that Measure 16 denies terminally ill patients equal protection would
dissipate if Oregon repealed its statute outlawing assisted suicide. In the absence of that statute,
there could be no force to the argument that Measure 16 denies to terminally ill people the same
protection afforded to other citizens. This solution appears unlikely due to the historical support of
such laws.
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inalizes assisted suicide, if that legislation is narrowly drafted and
contains adequate protections, than they are to hold unconstitutional
statutes that criminalize assisted suicide. So doing would exhibit the
kind of deference to democratic values and to the limited role of the
courts---especially when the partial decriminalization legislation is
enacted by referendum-that courts almost reflexively invoke when
hesitating to hold statutes unconstitutional.
241
The success or failure, both of attempts to legalize physician-assisted suicide
and of challenges to laws prohibiting assisted suicide, rests with the U.S.
Constitution. Whether one may reasonably argue that a constitutionally protected
right to physician-assisted suicide exists (fundamental or otherwise), it seems
unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court would agree to such an interpretation. 242
Although broad readings of certain judicial opinions suggest that a state's prohibition
against assisted suicide may unconstitutionally interfere with the right of privacy,
243
the Court appears hesitant to supplant that state's judgment.
244
In Lee v. Oregon, the District Court for the District of Oregon found that
Measure 16 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
245
The court's analysis was faulty, however, and its decision should be reversed. In
fact, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals itself said in no uncertain terms that Judge
Hogan had "clearly erred" in his "highly irregular" equal protection ruling.
246
Under certain circumstances, Measure 16 would have allowed persons
diagnosed with a terminal illness to be prescribed a lethal dose' of medication.
247
Therefore, the terminally ill would receive different treatment than the remainder of
Oregon's citizens for whom assisted suicide is a felony. 248 Treating one class
differently than the remainder of the state's population is acceptable if the
classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 249 In this case,
the State of Oregon correctly argued that allowing the terminally ill, but not other
241 MEISEL, supra note 82, at 510.
242 See supra Part 11I.
243 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (noting that the Court's precedents "have respected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter," and that "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
244 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (stating that a
state "is [not] required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a
physically able adult to starve to death"); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 ("Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
state.").
245 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995).
246 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 nn.138-39 (9th Cir. 1996).
247 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1995).
248 See id. § 163.125(1)(b).
249 See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238-39 (1981) (holding that Congress could make
a distinction between residents in public institutions receiving Medicaid funds for their care and
residents in such institutions not receiving such funds); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976) (holding that unless a classification tramples on "fundamental personal" rights or is drawn on
"inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage," the Court will presume the
constitutionality of the statutory discrimination and "require only that the classification challenged
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest").
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citizens, to receive lethal doses of medication rationally relates to its interest in,
among other things, avoiding unnecessary pain and suffering. 25
0
Should the courts strike down Measure 16, modifications to the Death with
Dignity Act might allow it to withstand the constitutional scrutiny it would surely
receive if passed again. The court's ruling noted problems with the determination of
whether a person requesting the prescription was really competent. 25' A tighter
system which requires evaluation by a mental health professional should satisfy the
court's objections.
It appears a challenge to Measure 16 on the grounds that it violates due process
would fail under traditional constitutional analysis. In light of the court's reasoning
on the equal protection issue, however, a reviewing court might find the law
unconstitutional on due process grounds as well. Still, suggested modifications
which would satisfy the court's objections with respect to the equal protection
violations would probably suffice to eliminate the due process concerns.
250 See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434.
251 See id. (noting that the procedures designed to differentiate between competent and
incompetent persons are insufficient).
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